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Routing
Electric utility restructuring was initiated in
the 1990s to remedy the problem of relatively
high electricity costs in the Northeast and
California. While politicians hoped that reform
would allow low-cost electricity to flow to high-
cost states and that competition would reduce
prices, economists wanted reform to eliminate
regulatory incentives to overbuild generating
capacity and spur the introduction of real-time
prices for electricity. 
Unfortunately, high-cost states have seen lit-
tle price relief, and competition has had a negli-
gible impact on prices. Meanwhile, the California
crisis of 2000–2001 has led many states to adopt
policies that would once again encourage excess
capacity. Finally, real-time pricing, although the
subject of experiments, has yet to emerge.
Most arresting, however, is the fact that restruc-
turing contributed to the severity of the 2000–2001
California electricity crisis and (some scholars also
argue) the August 2003 blackout in the Northeast,
without delivering many efficiency gains.
The poor track record of restructuring stems
from systemic problems inherent in the reforms
themselves. We recommend total abandonment
of restructuring and a more thoroughgoing
embrace of markets than contemplated in cur-
rent restructuring initiatives. But we recognize
that such reforms are politically difficult to
achieve. A second-best alternative would be for
those states that have already embraced restruc-
turing to return to an updated version of the old,
vertically integrated, regulated status quo. It’s
likely that such an arrangement would not be
that different from the arrangements that would
have developed under laissez faire. 
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Introduction
Throughout most of the 20th century, the
electricity sector in the United States was
characterized by balkanized regional and
state supply systems with significant barriers
to trade between them. Those supply systems
were vertically integrated (that is, the same
company owned the power generation facili-
ty, the transmission lines that delivered the
power to local transfer stations, and the
neighborhood power lines that brought elec-
tricity from transfer stations to the home),
unchallenged by competitors, and regulated
every step of the way by state public utility
commissions. By the early 1990s, however,
those systems (hereinafter the “old regime”)
produced large discrepancies in both prices
and costs between states. Large consumers of
electricity located in high-cost states de-
manded policy changes to reduce electricity
prices.1
The policy response has been the national
deregulation of the interstate wholesale mar-
ket to allow generators access to transmission
systems owned by others. Some high-cost
states went further and encouraged vertical
disintegration to separate ownership of gener-
ators from ownership of transmission and dis-
tribution systems. Some states have also
implemented retail choice programs to allow
consumers and generators to contract directly
using transmission and distribution systems
owned by others to transmit the electricity.2
States with low-cost electricity have
responded by resisting those policy changes
and attempting to maintain the old regime for
two reasons.3 First, while costs could conceiv-
ably be lower if market forces were introduced,
the costs in “traditional” states have been
acceptable to consumers even without the use
of market forces, largely because the low-cost
states avoided two high-cost strategies under-
taken by other states: nuclear power and
expensive long-term contracts undertaken at
the behest of the Public Utilities Regulatory
Policy Act of 1978.4
Second, the California meltdown and the
Northeast blackout have drastically reduced
politicians’ appetite for electricity regulatory
reform. To average voters and the politicians
who listen to them, change away from the old
regime is associated with bad outcomes
because the states that introduced the most
wide-ranging regulatory changes also experi-
enced the most problems over the last several
years. 
Accordingly, restructuring has been an
uneven process. Although competition was
introduced on interstate electricity systems,
the old regime still exists in most states. And
those states that have restructured their reg-
ulatory systems have also suffered embarrass-
ing adverse outcomes. 
The Case for Restructuring
Electric utility restructuring was a politi-
cal answer to the problem of high rates in the
Northeast and California. Firms threatened
to leave high-cost states, so those states
attempted to bring the low-cost electricity to
the firms. Under restructuring, local electric-
ity generators would no longer have a
monopoly over local customers. In theory,
distant (lower-cost) generators could com-
pete for business and rates would go down. 
Academic arguments for generation com-
petition were somewhat different. First,
because investment in capital received a guar-
anteed return, total generation investment
was excessive and skewed toward capital-
intensive facilities. The enthusiasm in the
1960s for nuclear power was the product of
excessive optimism about costs (progressives
regarded nuclear as an energy source that
would be “too cheap to meter”), the growing
hostility to coal-fired generation for environ-
mental reasons, and the guaranteed rate-of-
return regime that encouraged capital inten-
sity. But nuclear power costs, for the most
part, were much higher than anticipated.5
According to economists, introduction of
market forces into the generation side of elec-
tricity markets would eliminate the bias
toward capital-intensive projects by intro-
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Second, prices for electricity did not serve
their usual role of signaling to consumers the
marginal costs of additional consumption,
which vary by time of day and season.
Instead, the commonly used fixed rates
served solely as a device to recover costs. Thus
electricity prices were wrong all the time.
They were too low on peak and too high off
peak. Market forces, it was hoped, would
introduce marginal-cost pricing and as a
result reduce peak demand, increase off-peak
demand,6 and reduce the needless political
fighting (most notably, the eternal fight over
more supply versus less demand) that
inevitably arises in electricity markets
because of the absence of prices as a signaling
device.
Thus, for economists competition between
generators was supposed to discipline the cost
of generation and introduce the use of price
signals to allocate electricity rather than just
recover costs. 
The deregulation of interstate wholesale
electricity markets in 1992 and the restruc-
turing of state-level regulation, where it has
occurred, have induced owners of generators
to think about costs and risk. Catherine
Wolfram reports that owners of generators in
states that have restructured have reduced
their fixed costs.7 And if investors were not
aware of risk, they certainly are now. In the
1992–2002 period investors added too much
capacity resulting in low wholesale prices and
widespread bankruptcy in the electric gener-
ation sector.8
Prices to retail customers have been affect-
ed by restructuring in two ways. First, to the
extent that state public service commissions
now solicit bids from generators to serve so-
called default customers (those who do not
chose their own generator through retail
choice), consumers presumably benefit from
the competition. Yet the lower prices secured
through such programs are largely due to the
glut of generation capacity added over the last
several years, meaning that restructuring is
playing less of a role in those cost savings than
might appear to be the case.9 Lower wholesale
prices are also passed on to consumers in
those states that retain traditional regulation.
The original objective of economists, howev-
er—real-time pricing—has not been imple-
mented on a large scale anywhere.10
Restructuring has delivered some of its
promised benefits, but most Americans asso-
ciate markets in electricity with bad out-
comes because of California and the 2003
Northeast summer blackout. Accordingly,
anyone who believes market forces ought to
play a larger role in electricity has to argue
convincingly that
• the California meltdown and the North-
east blackout were not the result of mar-
ket forces;
• the low costs of the states still under the
old regulatory regime are not the result
of regulation; 
• gains to trade (efficiency improvements)
not possible in the regulated status quo
would take place in a truly deregulated
world; and 
• the “commons” nature of the alternat-
ing current (AC) transmission system
can be managed in a deregulated world.
Unfortunately, we would be lying if we
claimed that would be easy. 
The California Story
During 2000–2001 a large supply reduc-
tion in hydropower together with weather-
related demand increases (a hot summer and
very cold winter) raised electricity and natur-
al gas prices in California.11 Those price
increases were exacerbated by the regulation
of nitrogen oxide emissions in the Los
Angeles basin, some design features of the
California auction bidding system, and retail
price controls. 
The retail price controls were particularly
harmful in that they encouraged generators
to price high in the wholesale market because
there would be no reduction in demand at
the retail level as a consequence of their pric-
ing behavior. In addition, because retail price
controls prevented utilities from passing on














suffered a financial meltdown. Generators, in
turn, increased prices because of the possibil-
ity they would not be paid. From November
2000 on, the California story is a financial
meltdown story: wholesale prices had a large
credit-risk component.12
Those who believe in markets often argue
that an important lesson from California is
that true markets were never tried. In most of
the state that was true; wholesale deregula-
tion was combined with rigid retail prices.13
But market retail prices were used in San
Diego for a little more than a year, which
proved to be politically unstable. Prices in
San Diego were free of all controls from July
1999 through August 2000.14 The doubling
of rates that occurred during 2000 triggered
a consumer rebellion and the reenactment of
price controls by the California legislature.
Bushnell and Mansur estimate that after
controlling for weather and other sources of
non-price-related demand variation, a dou-
bling of prices resulted in a demand reduction
of 2.3 percent, an extremely disappointing
response.15 Peter Reiss and Matthew White, on
the other hand, found that after controlling
for trend and weather, consumption went
down a more robust 12–13 percent.16
Even though demand does respond to price,
many observers have concluded that demand-
responsiveness is too low and, therefore, price
spikes would be too high for too long in a truly
deregulated environment that experienced
tight supplies. If we switched from flat rate to
time-varying prices, there would be additional
efficiency gains, but there would also be redis-
tribution from large consumers whose use
varies more than that of the average customer
(and who, thus, benefit the most from flat
rates) to large customers whose use is relative-
ly constant across the daily and seasonal cycles
(and thus currently subsidize those whose use
varies a lot).17
The response of regulators to the San
Diego experiment has been a return to the
fixed-price system and the procurement of
extra capacity through nonmarket forces (so-
called installed capacity [ICAP] require-
ments) rather than peak prices, which cause
customers (voters) to revolt. Restructuring
plus ICAP requirements essentially returns
us to the world before restructuring, the
main economic defect of which was excess
generation capacity and price signals that did
not convey the price of (otherwise underuti-
lized) peak supply.18
The Blackout Story
The blackout of August 14, 2003, illus-
trates the difficulty of managing externalities
on the grid. Although markets per se were
not responsible for the blackout, the shift
over the last 30 years from balkanized, verti-
cally integrated utilities to independent
power producers and vertically disintegrated
power service providers has increased the
number of players whose behavior has to be
coordinated to maintain satisfactory opera-
tion of the North American Transmission
System.19
The final report of the U.S.-Canada Power
System Outage Task Force concludes that
poor tree maintenance along transmission
lines in the First Energy (Ohio) service area,
combined with inoperative computer soft-
ware and operator errors, was the proximate
cause of the blackout.20 Although the black-
out was not caused by market forces, the task
force did state that “it is likely that the
increased loads and flows across a transmis-
sion grid that has experienced little new
investment is causing greater stress upon the
hardware, software, and human beings that
are critical components of the system.”21
Transmission investment is problematic
for two reasons. First, transmission projects
are considered, approved, and paid for at the
state level even though they have benefits
that cross state lines. Accordingly, there is a
mismatch between the decisionmaking and
regulatory frameworks that govern transmis-
sion investment and the real geographic
impact of those improvements.22 State deci-
sionmakers understandably resist using
ratepayer dollars to pay for investments that
will primarily help parties outside the state.
Second, incumbent utilities and state
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resist improving the grid. Vertically integrat-
ed companies in those states fear that a more
robust transmission system will primarily
advantage the competition—merchant gener-
ators. Politicians in those states oppose grid
improvements because the benefits of cheap-
er generation technologies—particularly old
coal-fired plants—would then flow to the
highest bidder rather than exclusively to
ratepayers within their states.
Of course, blackouts were not unheard of
in the days of the old regime, and little can be
intelligently said about the risks of blackouts
today versus the risks of blackouts two
decades ago. But to the extent that electric
utility restructuring has placed added stress
on the transmission system, it has made cop-
ing with unexpected events like blackouts
more difficult. 
About Those Low-Cost States 
Political support for restructuring had lit-
tle to do with the promotion of real-time pric-
ing or with reducing the incentives to over-
build or to overcontract for power. Instead, it
stemmed from the possibility of transmitting
low-cost power from states like Kentucky (4.3
cents per kWh in 2002) to states like New York
(11.3 cents per kWh in 2002).23 Few recognize,
however, that states like Kentucky have low
electricity costs because they have not changed
very much from the nonmarket status quo of
1965. Most importantly, most of the low-cost
states never abandoned the use of coal in the
production of electricity, and some of those
states had continued access to cheap hydro-
power. None of those states aggressively
implemented long-term fixed-price PURPA
independent power contracts. Those states
also retained rate regulation, which transfers
resources from producers to consumers
through the use of weighted-average pricing
for electricity.24
An understanding of why weighted-aver-
age pricing transfers wealth from producers
to consumers requires a quick review of some
economic fundamentals. In a free market, the
prices of commodities are determined by the
most expensive source of supply necessary to
meet demand.25 In markets in which increas-
ing output is available at constant marginal
cost, the price of new supply does not differ
from the price of existing supply. But in some
markets, increasing output is available only
at increasing marginal cost. 
In electricity markets nuclear and coal-
fired electricity plants have high fixed but
low marginal costs, while natural-gas-fired
units have lower fixed but higher marginal
costs. Because nuclear and coal plants are
large, incremental increases in electricity sup-
ply come from smaller natural-gas-fired
units. Increased electric output is thus avail-
able only at increasing marginal cost. In mar-
kets where aggregate supply consists of pro-
ducers with differing marginal costs, the
market price must be high enough to cover
the marginal costs of the last producer
(whose output is necessary to meet demand)
plus a normal return.
In an unregulated electricity market, then,
marginal sources of electricity—such as high-
cost generators typically in operation only
during the peak-demand periods—would
need to earn at least a normal return. That
implies that those facilities with lower mar-
ginal costs whose supply is limited (such as
old coal-fired units exempt from plant-spe-
cific emission controls under the 1970 and
1977 Clean Air Act amendments and
hydropower facilities whose supply can’t be
expanded) would receive payments in excess
of marginal cost (and a normal return) in an
unregulated market. 
Rate regulation by the states, however,
suppresses that process. Consumers are
charged a weighted average of generator
costs rather than the market price, which
would be at least the marginal cost of the
most costly unit necessary to meet demand.
In a free market, the proportion of elec-
tricity produced by coal or hydropower would
not affect prices if neither is the marginal
source of power (and both are not). But in
regulated electricity markets, cheap infra-
marginal power does lower electricity prices to
consumers because prices are weighted aver-













costs of the most expensive producer. Thus
regulation plays a role in the low prices of
electricity in those states that maintain the
old regulatory regime.
Because Kentucky’s low prices reflect aver-
age rather than marginal costs, the efficiency
gains that might occur from connecting
Kentucky with New York via improved trans-
mission may be largely illusory. The expand-
ed Kentucky output would probably have
costs greater than 4.3 cents per kWh because
the main source of low prices is cheap infra-
marginal coal generation whose supply can’t
be expanded because it is the result of old
sources (under the Clean Air Act) whose sup-
ply cannot be expanded by definition.26
Because the supply of that cheap power is
fixed, if consumers outside of Kentucky were
allowed access to that power, its price would
be bid up to just below the price of the expen-
sive power it was supposed to replace.
If natural gas is the fuel source for increas-
es in electricity output everywhere and coal is
infra-marginal, then prices would not vary
across states in an unregulated market
because the price of gas-fired output would
set the market price everywhere and be large-
ly the same. If we are correct, this implies that
gains to trade not occurring under the cur-
rent balkanized system are much smaller
than many observers believe. 
Accordingly, the fight between the old regime
and a restructured regime (that is, the case for a
transmission-intense versus balkanized sys-
tem) is a fight about wealth rather than efficiency.
This is why low-cost states vigorously resist a
national integrated electricity market—it
would allow their electricity to go to the
highest bidders rather than to those who
happen to reside within an electric utility’s
current service territory. Because there is a
relatively fixed supply of this low-cost elec-
tricity, mandatory open access involves
wealth redistribution as much as, and maybe
even more than, efficiency gains. 
AC Transmission System Is a Commons
In regulated markets, it is usually quite
easy for economists to demonstrate that con-
sumers do not benefit from regulation. To be
sure, weighted-average pricing under regula-
tion redistributes from off-peak users to on-
peak, but unlike many other markets, elec-
tricity markets have characteristics that are
difficult to manage through property rights
and contracts. Accordingly, regulation has at
least the possibility of a plausible rationale. 
For example, the alternating current (AC)
grid is a “commons.” That is, the physical real-
ity of the grid does not coincide with current
private property rights or the 50-state regula-
tory schemes that govern the grid. Power
added by any generator on an AC transmis-
sion system follows all paths but favors those
with least resistance rather than the shortest
distance between generator and customer.
Thus bilateral contracts between any willing
seller and buyer of electricity affect all other
buyers and sellers within each interconnected
system in ways that are not captured by
prices—the textbook definition of externality.
The proper way to manage those externalities
is a subject of great dispute.
Moreover, transmission additions confer
benefits across all generators and consumers
on the grid and thus have public good char-
acteristics. The development of property
rights and prices that internalize those char-
acteristics is very difficult.
Traditionally, the commons problem was
addressed through monopoly-franchise verti-
cal integration. Trade between vertically inte-
grated utilities was never very large and was
governed by barter arrangements rather than
markets. Where trade was extensive, voluntary
arrangements such as the Pennsylvania-New
Jersey-Maryland transmission pool (PJM)
arose to manage the flows across separately
owned transmission systems through con-
tract. Thus, historically, the “commons” char-
acteristics of the grid did not create large exter-
nality issues. 
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 and orders
888 and 889 from the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, however, facilitated
the development of widespread trading on
the grid—particularly by nonvertically inte-












New York may be
largely illusory.
between the physical reality of the grid and
its current governance structure has since
become an important problem.
The Verdict on Markets
In light of our discussion of the California
electricity crisis, the 2003 blackout, the low
electricity prices found in heavily regulated
states, and the physical nature of the electrici-
ty grid, can one defend the case for increased
reliance on market forces in the electricity sec-
tor? Yes—but it is unclear exactly what kind of
market is best suited for this industry and how
much could be gained through reform. Until
now, restructuring has imposed a particular
vision of what an efficient electricity market
would look like, but that model has traded
one set of economic problems for another.
The main hurdle that proponents of deregula-
tion must surmount is the problematic nature
of the transmission grid, the subject of the
next section. 
Solving the Public Goods
Problem
What are the possible solutions to the pub-
lic good nature of the transmission system?
The most commonly discussed possibility is
aggressive regulation by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission through mandatory
utility participation in regional transmission
organizations, which would be responsible for
long-term management of the electricity grid.
The FERC also favors a standard market
design for the industry (including provisions
to ensure that adequate generation capacity is
available) to eliminate the discrepancy be-
tween the commons nature of the transmis-
sion system and the current fragmented sys-
tem that governs it.27 
The problem with that answer isn’t so
much that it involves regulation per se. In fact,
many of the standard market design rules
would be adopted by utilities that voluntarily
wanted to engage in interstate trade. The
problem is that many utilities are happy with
the state-based cartels that now exist. They
don’t want to facilitate trade because it would
mean facilitating competitors coming into
their service territories. And they don’t want to
be responsible for investment in transmission
if they don’t receive all the benefits. 
Moreover, why bother implementing the
federal solution if it leaves state-level regulation
intact, with its impediments to electricity trade
and lack of recognition of the regional spillover
effects of transmission investment? The feder-
al solution also confuses rather than clarifies
incentives in the governance of transmission
by separating ownership from control.28
Nobel laureate economist Vernon Smith
believes that private solutions are possible.29
He argues that new transmission is a “club
good” that facilitates the ability of generators
to get their product to market. Consortia of
generators could fund new investment and,
in turn, get rights to inject or take power
from the system in proportion to their finan-
cial contributions. MIT economist Paul
Joskow is skeptical, however: 
Transmission investment decisions do
not immediately strike me as being ide-
ally suited to relying entirely on the
invisible hand. Transmission invest-
ments are lumpy, characterized by
economies of scale and can have physi-
cal impacts throughout the network.
The combination of imperfectly defined
property rights, economies of scale and
long-lived sunk costs for transmission
investments, and imperfect competi-
tion in the supply of generating services
can lead to either underinvestment or
overinvestment at particular points on
the network if we rely entirely on market
forces.30
In short, the weakness of the private solu-
tion is the inability of investors to capture the
full benefits of their investment. 
An institution drawn from petroleum
economics—the unitization contract—illus-
trates one possible solution to the problems
raised by Joskow as well as the difficulty of its












producers find that surface property rights
do not coincide with the geological charac-
teristics of petroleum reservoirs. This dis-
crepancy creates incentives to drill and pump
fast before other surface owners do the same,
because no one represents the interests of the
entire oil field. 
A unitization contract is a set of payoffs to
all existing surface owners that induces them
to give up their production autonomy. In
theory, surface owners consent to such a con-
tract if operation of the reservoir by one oper-
ator produces enough excess revenue that the
distribution of the excess induces all existing
owners to give up their rights and still leaves
a surplus.31
In the electricity context, the use of the
unitization contract analogy leads to the fol-
lowing questions: 
• Is there a set of payoffs to all existing play-
ers in electricity transmission (including
state regulatory regimes and incumbent
utilities) that would induce them to turn
over operation of their systems to a wel-
fare-maximizing operator in return for a
contractually determined share of the
increased profits? 
• What plan would the welfare-optimiz-
ing operator implement? 
• Is the plan achievable through private
action or are transaction costs prohibi-
tively high? 
• And, if they are high, is coercion by FERC
likely to achieve the same outcome?
The most pertinent question is the first.
Are the unexploited gains to trade large
enough to allow payoffs to all existing players
in electricity transmission and still leave a
surplus?
Doug Hale and his colleagues suggest
that the unexploited gains from trade may be
high in the eastern part of the United States.
They found that several small transmission
investments better linking New England
with New York would reduce peak power
prices considerably in the summer across sev-
eral states.32 It would appear that the gains to
consumers far exceed the costs of the invest-
ments—the textbook definition of unexploit-
ed gains to trade—and yet the links have not
been built because no one represents the ben-
eficiaries across numerous state and utility
boundaries. 
But the gains from trade are true efficien-
cy gains rather than wealth transfers only if
there is underutilized capacity in existing
coal-fired plants that is priced at marginal
cost. Once that underutilized capacity is
gone and the marginal sources of electricity—
both local and long distance—are natural gas,
gains from trade exist only if the transmis-
sion costs are less than the higher fixed costs
(land and labor) of locating generation near
urban consumers. And to the extent that the
price differences across states represent
weighted-average rather than marginal-cost
differences, potential gains to trade may be
zero.
The other important source of efficiency
gains is real-time pricing. According to
Maloney, McCormick, and Sauer, the poten-
tial gains are large because peak uses would
respond to high peak prices by shifting use to
other times of day and reducing off-peak
underutilization of generation facilities. They
report that full utilization of conventional
steam-electric “baseload” facilities would
result in a 25.5 percent increase in power pro-
duction and a similar percentage decrease in
price to an average 5.1 cents per kwh for the
country.33 Unfortunately, mandatory open
access and restructuring have not involved
the use of real-time pricing. Regardless, one
could implement real-time pricing without
deregulation.
Our analysis to this point has considered
only the static efficiency gains possible
through increased reliance on market forces.
We find that those potential gains may be
rather small, especially in the absence of price
incentives to shift consumption from peak to
off peak. 
Yet the pursuit of innovation and dynamic
efficiency (how to organize a business) is as
important—if not more so—than the pursuit







vice within a set organizational structure).
Market agents are simply far better at discov-
ering innovative organizational structures,
manufacturing practices, product lines, pric-
ing regimes, and retail service arrangements
than are state regulatory officials or the
incumbent monopolies they regulate.34
Economists Arthur De Vaney and W. David
Walls, in the course of a similar discussion
about the merits of deregulating the natural
gas sector, go so far as to argue that policy
analysts ought to “forget about static effi-
ciency; no one knows where the industry is
headed or how it will need to adapt to future
circumstances.”35
Industry design by policy makers
founders on the complexity of the
design problem; it is a search for local
optima only. Regulatory policy that
aims at a social optimum is too vague.
Yet policy that aims at a specific goal is
too narrow. The attempt to optimize
policy for a given goal produces a nar-
row optimum that lacks robustness
and may be far from optimal when cir-
cumstances change. 
Successful innovations in industry
institutions and organizations are more
likely to produce gains in efficiency
than are changes in how a firm prices a
particular product. These innovations
are more likely to come from the inter-
actions of the participants in the
process; in other words, effective prod-
ucts and organizations are more likely
to be self-organized rather than handed
down from above.36
Given the resistance of many traditional
utilities to the FERC’s standard market design
proposal, however, it seems clear that the
industry would return to vertical integration
and balkanized service territories if given the
chance.37 How the industry might evolve in
the future—or what new modes of operation
the industry would pursue in the near term if
freed from government regulation—we cannot
predict.
Back to the Future?
A central implication of our analysis is
that vertical integration may be the most effi-
cient organizational structure for the electric-
ity industry. In the name of advancing com-
petition in the generation sector, however,
mandatory open access requires much addi-
tional regulation to govern the interaction of
independent generators and the AC grid
“commons.” And with the revival of installed
capacity requirements, we recreate the costs
of excess capacity that led to the call for gen-
eration competition in the first place. 
If the static efficiency gains from manda-
tory open access are smaller than advertised
and the costs created by the regulatory appa-
ratus necessary to achieve them are large,
what should we do? Traditional vertically
integrated utilities are often low cost, but
they restrict trade and seem to prefer state-
based cartels. If they were totally deregulated
(including transmission and distribution)
they probably wouldn’t change their behav-
ior very much because entry and rivalry are
difficult as long as they control the “high-
ways” over which electricity trade takes place.
The only competition they would face is
from large customers who generate their own
power from natural gas cogeneration, but
that threat has been considerably weakened
by the doubling of natural gas prices.
Such a realization led many well-meaning
people to support mandatory open access in
order to “force” competition and rivalry to
occur. But that has required the substitution
of legal orders for vertical integration to
manage transmission externalities, and that
has not been successful. 
Our sense is that we should go either for-
ward with true deregulation or backward to
the old regime but not stay in mandatory
open-access limbo, which is more regulatory
than the old status quo, with few if any bene-
fits. We should either deregulate generation,
transmission, and distribution; allow all
arrangements to be determined by contract;









through dynamic efficiency,38 or we should
go backwards to a world of vertical integra-
tion and incentivised rate regulation.
To execute the forward transition, Congress
would simply declare that state regulation of
the electricity business is an unconstitutional
interference with interstate commerce—a
precedent established when Congress pre-
empted state trucking regulation.39 Congress
would then remove any legal barriers to vertical
reintegration of the industry and any require-
ment that grid owners open their wires to par-
ties under regulated terms and conditions.
Service territories, however, would no longer be
protected, and politically created barriers to
entry would be eliminated. 
Such a proposal would be politically
unpopular because of the widespread fear that
unrestrained local power monopolies would
“gouge” both commercial and residential con-
sumers, even though the evidence does not
suggest that regulation has constrained prices
below monopoly levels.40 State legislators and
public service commissions, moreover, would
resist a congressional move to eliminate their
roles.
True deregulation would be an easier sell
if one could be certain of the gains to trade
that would occur if it were not for the current
ownership and governance system. The rea-
son that this is so difficult is probably the
same as the reason that the political obstacles
described by the unitization analogy have
been so hard to overcome. 
Accordingly, a second-best solution might
be to go backwards: to accept the regulatory
oversight of electric power companies (over-
sight that would include utility prices and
investment decisions) in return for manage-
ment of the transmission commons through
vertical integration. 
The differences between a regulated and
an unregulated market may not be as great in
the electricity sector as they are in other mar-
kets. That’s because, in an unregulated world,
the relations between electric firms and con-
sumers would likely be governed by long-
term contracts because the dedicated nature
of electricity assets implies that each side can
“hold up” the other.41 That is, once assets are
in place, consumers might refuse to pay any-
thing above a plant’s marginal costs and
firms could well be forced to accept such
demands because the plant’s assets cannot be
dedicated to other uses and the plant itself
cannot move to more lucrative service terri-
tories. And, conversely, customers would like-
ly not agree to spot-market relationships
with electric firms because entry and rivalry
from other firms is difficult, thus reducing
consumers’ ability to avoid extortion from
firms under spot prices. 
Accordingly, the relationship between
firms and consumers in a totally unregulated
world might very well include some guaran-
teed return for firms and fixed prices for con-
sumers. The only question then is how dif-
ferent the specifics of regulation would be
from such hypothetical contracts. 
Fortunately, the problems associated with
regulation are fewer today than they were 30
or 40 years ago because incentive-based (IB)
regulation has replaced traditional rate-of-
return (ROR) regulation.42 Under IB regula-
tion, owners have an incentive to reduce
rather than increase costs and thus would
not have the same incentive to have an exces-
sively large generation investment (i.e.,
nuclear power plants).
One way to reap the advantages of the old
regime while still allowing more electricity
trade between service territories would be to
promote the more extensive use of direct cur-
rent DC transmission links between AC sys-
tems that have one owner and thus no exter-
nalities. DC links end the commons problem
because the electricity flows would not affect
third parties on the grid.43
Smaller AC systems with DC connections
between them cost more, but such a design
reduces externalities and management re-
quirements. George Loehr, a member of the
New York State Reliability Council, estimates
that it would cost $7–8 billion to break up
the eastern interconnection into 10 smaller
interconnections linked by DC lines.44
Finally, a regulated system could intro-







be as great in the
electricity sector
as they are in
other markets.
and industrial users. Such prices would pro-
vide very effective incentives for innovation
by both electricity suppliers and consumers.
Conclusion
Electricity restructuring was originally
embraced by many economists because they
believed that reforms would reduce the
incentive to build excess generating capacity,
eliminate the incentive to build capital-inten-
sive generating facilities, and lead to an intro-
duction of real-time pricing. Many investors
in electricity generation are now responsible
for their own fate, but the drastic overbuild-
ing of generation has left most of them in
bankruptcy.45
While restructuring does not have quite as
bad a record as the anti-market faction would
maintain, it has created problems previously
unknown in the electricity sector. Those
problems generally arose because electricity
restructuring
• focused on generation competition and
ignored the pricing and incentive issues
involved managing the transmission
system and its public commons charac-
teristics;
• grafted a relatively free wholesale market
onto a still heavily regulated retail mar-
ket; and
• established artificial market institutions
that invited manipulation and abuse.
The end result has proven far from satis-
factory.
There is little reason to think that the
restructuring experiment will produce im-
proved results in the future. The problems
with the current regime are systematic.
Ironically, the ICAP regime essentially returns
us to the old status quo without saying so. 
We do not expect full, genuine deregula-
tion to happen in the foreseeable future. But
we do expect the case for restructuring as it is
currently conceived to come under increas-
ing political and economic stress.
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